Pa. Supreme Court Takes a Stance on the Approach to Severance of a Joint Tenancy

In a recent decision handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Grant v. Grant, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 1261 (Apr. 9, 2025), the court dealt with the effect of a self-conveyance of real property where a mother sought to sever a joint tenancy with her son.

As background, in a joint tenancy, each owner possesses the whole estate rather than a fractional share. The defining feature of this arrangement is the presence of the four unities: interest, title, time and possession. Put differently, joint tenants must acquire identical interests in the same property, by the same instrument, at the same time, and each must hold an undivided right to possess the entire estate.

The hallmark that distinguishes a joint tenancy from a tenancy in common is the right of survivorship. When one joint tenant dies, that tenant’s share does not pass through a will or intestate succession; instead, the surviving joint tenant automatically inherits the decedent’s interest.

By contrast, a tenancy in common—now the most common form of co-ownership—requires only the unity of possession. Each tenant in common owns a distinct fractional share in the property, and there is no right of survivorship. Upon a tenant in common’s death, that person’s interest passes to heirs or devisees rather than to the surviving co-owners.

In Grant, the mother acquired a property in Murrysville, Pennsylvania, and titled it jointly with her son with rights of survivorship and the son thereafter resided at the property, the opinion said.

After their relationship deteriorated, the mother filed a partition action, seeking to divide the property into separately owned interests.

While that action was pending, the mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in the property from herself, as grantor, to herself, as grantee and the deed expressly stated its purpose was to sever the joint tenancy and create a tenancy in common, the opinion said.

When the mother passed away, she left her estate to her daughters.

One of her daughters, who became the executor of her mother’s estate, substituted herself as a party in the ongoing partition action.

The son then argued the partition action terminated upon the mother’s death and that the property passed to him in full under the survivorship provision contained in the original deed between them and, in doing so, he contended that the quitclaim deed was legally ineffective to sever the joint tenancy, the opinion said.

The trial court in Grant ultimately agreed, holding that neither the partition action nor the quitclaim deed severed the joint tenancy.

Citing to Sheridan v. Lucey, 149 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1959), the trial court ruled that the mother’s death abated the partition action, and that her quitclaim deed, executed solely to herself, did not destroy the “four unities” required for joint tenancy and, consequently, the property vested entirely in the son by right of survivorship.

On appeal, the Superior Court in Grant affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

In an unpublished memorandum, the Superior Court emphasized that severance of a joint tenancy requires an act so definitive that the party cannot “retreat” from the severance. Because the mother’s self-conveyance left her interest intact and did not transfer it to a third party, the Superior Court found the deed insufficient.

In doing so, the Superior Court drew parallels to its prior unpublished decision in Wolf v. Nearing, 272 A.3d 493 (Pa. Super 2022), where a deed from one joint tenant to herself and her husband likewise failed to sever a joint tenancy.

Similarly, the Superior Court in Grant concluded that the mother’s quitclaim deed of self-conveyance was “not sufficient to sever the four unities of joint tenancy,” and, therefore, the son maintained full title to the property upon her death.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, it dealt with whether a self-directed quitclaim deed is sufficient to sever a joint tenancy under Pennsylvania law.

Pennsylvania courts have long held that joint tenancies may be severed by unilateral action, provided that action is clear, unequivocal and irrevocable.

For instance, in Sheridan, the Supreme Court emphasized that severance requires an act “of sufficient manifestation that the actor is unable to retreat from his position.”

Likewise, in Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. 1986), the Supreme Court explained that a joint tenancy may be destroyed by any act that “clearly and unequivocally signifies an intent to sever.” When severance occurs, the estate is converted into a tenancy in common.

Certain actions have consistently been recognized as sufficient to sever: executing a sales agreement to a third party, Yannopoulos v. Sophos, 365 A.3d 1312, 1314 (Pa. Super. 1976), or mortgaging the property to a lender, General Credit v. Cleck; Simpson’s Lessee v. Ammons, 609 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa. Super. 1992). Other acts, such as filing a partition action, demonstrate intent but remain revocable and, therefore, insufficient until judgment is entered.

Although intent plays a central role, courts in Pennsylvania continue to recognize the relevance of the traditional “four unities.”

As the Supreme Court observed in In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d 471 (Pa. 2006), “a joint tenancy is severed when one or more of the four unities is destroyed.” This tension—between intent-based reasoning and the formalism of the four unities—frames the debate over self-directed quitclaim deeds.

• The Formalist Approach

The traditional common law rule requires the destruction of at least one unity to effect severance. Because a self-conveyance to oneself does not disturb any of the unities, it has historically been ineffective. To achieve severance, courts historically required conveyance to a “straw man” who would then reconvey to the original joint tenant. This device destroyed the unity of title, thereby converting the estate into a tenancy in common.

• The Intent-Based Approach

Modern criticism has targeted this formalism as archaic. Legal scholars have argued that severance doctrine should instead focus on effectuating the intent of the parties.

Several jurisdictions have moved in this direction. Courts in California, Illinois, Florida, Utah, Colorado, and others have held that self-conveyance by quitclaim deed may suffice to sever, emphasizing intent rather than ritual adherence to unity.

Here, the executor of the mother’s estate urged the Supreme Court to abandon the formalist approach, asserting that the quitclaim deed was a sufficient manifestation of her mother’s intent to sever the joint tenancy.

The executor points to Yannopoulos, where the Superior Court held that the execution of a sale agreement immediately destroyed the unity of title. The Superior Court however, points out that Yannopoulos dealt with a conveyance to a third party, whereas, here, the conveyance from the mother was to herself.

Next, the executor argued that the presumption under Pennsylvania law against joint tenancies should also support a presumption in favor of severance. The Supreme Court in Grant rejected this reasoning, clarifying that the presumption applies only to the creation of joint tenancies, reflecting their historical decline in favor of tenancies in common.

The executor further claimed there is no logical basis to distinguish between methods of creating and severing joint tenancies. The Supreme Court in Grant disagreed, noting that while creation bestows a survivorship right, severance removes it, and unilateral severance risks undermining the expectations of co-tenants.

In applying the law to the facts, the Supreme Court in Grant held that the mother’s quitclaim deed to herself did not sever the joint tenancy. Although she expressed an intent to sever, the Supreme Court found that the deed failed to disturb any of the four unities—title, time, interest, or possession—that define a joint tenancy. Because her ownership remained unchanged before, during, and after the self-conveyance, no severance occurred.

The Supreme Court in Grant contrasted this with a conveyance to a third party, which would break the unity of title and time, converting the estate into a tenancy in common. By comparison, the Supreme Court noted that the self-conveyance left the mother’s ownership identical, as though “she jumped into the air and landed in the same spot.”

The Supreme Court in Grant reaffirmed that severance requires both intent and an act that irreversibly destroys one of the four unities. This rule balances predictability with respect for the parties’ intentions. Since the mother’s deed did not meet that threshold, the joint tenancy remained intact and the Superior Court’s ruling was, therefore, affirmed.

If you or someone you know is having issues with a joint tenant, remember: file a partition action and act diligently to obtain your judgment!

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