Pa. Supreme Court Clarifies 'Unity of Use' for Noncontiguous Parcels in Eminent Domain Cases

In a decision that could reshape how property rights are valued in our commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in Pignetti v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 597 (Apr. 25, 2025), that property owners may receive just compensation for noncontiguous parcels taken by the government—so long as those parcels were functionally unified. In a closely divided opinion, the Supreme Court interpreted Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa. C.S. Section 101 et seq., to allow grouped valuation of separate properties when used together for a common purpose. The ruling marks a significant shift in how courts may assess the impact of takings on complex property holdings, especially in cases involving commercial or agricultural operations spread across multiple tracts.

According to the opinion, in 2019, PennDOT filed a declaration of taking in connection with an I-95 infrastructure project, condemning a portion of property owned by Gianni and Jennifer Pignetti.

One parcel, located at 1035-1041 North Front St. and 4-18 Richmond St. (Parcel 44), was jointly owned by the couple. The other parcel, 22 Richmond St. (Parcel 45), was owned individually by Gianni Pignetti, the opinion said.

A small, unused strip of land several feet wide separated the two parcels, making them noncontiguous, the opinion said.

While the Pignettis did not contest the taking itself, they filed a petition seeking the appointment of a board of viewers to determine just compensation.

In their petition, they argued that the condemned parcels should be valued together under Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code.

Section 705 provides that, where noncontiguous parcels are under substantially identical ownership and are “used together for a unified purpose,” they should be valued as one parcel, the opinion said.

In support of their claim, the Pignettis submitted an affidavit and photographs showing that both parcels were used to store materials and vehicles for Gianni Pignetti’s electrical business.

PennDOT objected to the petition, arguing the owners had waived their claim by failing to file preliminary objections to the condemnation declaration and that the parcels lacked the necessary unity of purpose, the opinion said.

The trial court overruled those objections, finding that the Pignettis had not waived their plottage claim and that the parcels were indeed used together for a unified purpose, the opinion said. In doing so, the trial court emphasized that both parcels were used in connection with Gianni Pignetti’s business and concluded that this shared use satisfied the statutory requirement.

Thus, the trial court granted the Pignettis’ petition to appoint a board of viewers.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s ruling in a unanimous decision.

Turning to the legislative history of Section 705, the Commonwealth Court relied on Morris v. Commonwealth, 80 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1951), which required that two properties be "so inseparably connected" that damage to one would necessarily harm the other. Although Morris predated Section 705, the Commonwealth Court observed that it had applied the case in several cases after.

The Commonwealth Court concluded that, although the Pignettis showed that the parcels were used together, they had failed to meet the “Morris standard,” which requires establishing that the parcels “are so inseparably connected” that loss of one parcel would permanently injure the use of the other.

On appeal, the Supreme Court granted review to address whether the Commonwealth Court had erred in imposing an overly rigid interpretation of Section 705.

The Pignettis argued that the Morris standard is more stringent than what Section 705 requires.

They further argued Morris and other cases relied upon by the Commonwealth Court should not be controlling as they predate, rather than interpret, Section 705.

According to the opinion, the Pignettis pointed to clear discrepancies between Morris and the text of Section 705, imploring the Supreme Court to defer to the language adopted by the legislature.

In response, PennDOT argued that Section 705 was intended to codify Morris and other preexisting caselaw it cited in its ruling. Further, in spite of multiple amendments made to other language in Section 705, Pennsylvania courts have decided cases echoing the Morris standard, which, according to PennDOT, is suggestive legislative approval.

Additionally, PennDOT asserted that the Pignettis’ interpretation would lead to there being “no meaningful restriction on what noncontiguous parcels could be valued as one,” going against the intent of the Eminent Domain Code.

A majority of the Supreme Court, agreeing with the Pignettis and the trial court, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling.

Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Justice David Wecht criticized the Commonwealth Court for relying on judicial commentary and pre-code precedent rather than starting with the statute’s plain language.

Wecht explained that Section 705 does not require a showing of “inseparable use” or permanent injury from partial condemnation, but rather it requires only that noncontiguous parcels be used “together for a unified purpose.”

The majority opinion emphasized that statutory interpretation must begin with the text and that courts may not insert conditions not found in the statute.

Citing to 1 Pa. C.S. Section 1921(c), the Supreme Court through the majority opinion reaffirmed that clear statutory language must be enforced as written.

The majority opinion concluded that the use of both parcels in connection with a single business enterprise constituted a “unified purpose” under Section 705.

According to the majority opinion, the record showed that both properties were coordinated in their use as storage locations for Gianni Pignetti’s electrical contracting work, rejecting the idea that noncontiguous parcels must be functionally interdependent to qualify.

The majority opinion also addressed the legislative history cited by the Commonwealth Court.

While acknowledging that a comment to the original 1964 version of the Eminent Domain Code cited Morris, the majority opinion pointed out that commentary cannot override clear statutory text.

The majority opinion further explained that even if ambiguity existed, courts must construe the Eminent Domain Code liberally to effectuate its purpose—ensuring that condemnees receive just compensation.

The majority opinion warned against adopting a standard so strict that it would prevent property owners from recovering fair compensation for parcels that, while technically noncontiguous, are clearly used for an integrated purpose, emphasizing that just compensation requires a realistic valuation of how land is actually used.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kevin Brobson, joined by Justices Christine Donohue and Daniel McCaffery, argued that the interpretation made by the majority of the Supreme Court risked expanding Section 705 too far. The dissent of the Supreme Court contended that removing the interdependence requirement would allow almost any properties under common ownership to be combined for valuation, undermining the intent of the drafters of Section 705.

The dissent of the Supreme Court warned that such a shift could complicate condemnation proceedings and distort property valuations.

Nevertheless, the majority of the Supreme Court held firm, emphasizing that the Commonwealth Court had improperly raised the bar by requiring inseparable use, a concept not found in the statutory text.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pignetti clarified that Section 705’s “unified purpose” requirement is met when noncontiguous parcels are functionally used toward a unified objective, such as operating a business.

This ruling is likely to have substantial implications for future eminent domain disputes.

Property owners who use multiple parcels for a business or development will be better positioned when seeking compensation for the combined value of their holdings, even if the parcels are not contiguous.

Though it is worth emphasizing that only a small strip of unowned land separated the two parcels here, courts in Pennsylvania may be less willing to apply the unified purpose doctrine where the parcels are divided by a more substantial barrier.

For condemning authorities like PennDOT, the ruling underscores the need to carefully examine claims of unified use and to build a factual record to contest them when appropriate.

In the wake of Pignetti, practitioners involved in condemnation proceedings should expect to see increased reliance on Section 705. As such, they should their clients to document shared usage patterns across properties more thoroughly, particularly where the parcels are not physically connected. Under such circumstances, photographs, affidavits, and testimony demonstrating that their properties serve coordinated roles in a business or development plan could now carry greater weight.

Conversely, municipalities and agencies conducting takings may need to develop strategies to rebut unity-of-use claims—perhaps by highlighting differing ownership interests, inconsistent usage patterns, or a lack of meaningful coordination between parcels.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pignetti reaffirms the owner-protective intent behind the Eminent Domain Code. By rejecting judicially imposed limitations predating the text, the Supreme Court aligned its reasoning with the principle that compensation must reflect the real-world value of property as used—not merely as divided by paper boundaries.

—Michael Lipson, a rising second-year student at the Temple University Beasley School of Law and summer associate at the firm, contributed to this article.